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Students of human fertility have been aware for a long time that there
may be some special relation between the number (quantity) of children
ever born to a family and the "quality" of their children as perceived by
others if not by the parents. One need only cite the negative correlation
between quantity and quality of children per family so often observed
in both cross-section and time-series data. One of us (Becker 1960) more
than a decade ago stressed the importance for understanding fertility
(quantity) of the interaction between quantity and quality, and we are
pleased to note that this interaction is emphasTized in this book, and espe-
cially by De Tray and Willis.
Some economists have argued that the negative relation between quan-
tity and quality often observed is a consequence of a low substitution
elasticity in a family's utility function between parents' consumption or
level of living and that of their children (see, e.g., Duesenberry 1960;
Willis 1969). The approach followed by De Tray in this volume is differ-
ent, but it makes equally special assumptions about the substitution
between quantity and quality in the utility function and in household
production.
We want to argue here that one can go a long way toward understanding
data on the interaction between quantity and quality as well as on
quantity or quality alone without assuming that, either in the utility
function or in household production, quantity and quality are more closely
related than any two commodities chosen at random. The analysis that
follows is sketchy and incomplete, mainly because we have only recently
developed this line of argument.
The key feature in our analysis is that the shadow price of children
with respect to their number (i.e., the cost of an additional child, holding
their quality constant) is greater the higher their quality is. Similarly,
the shadow price of children with respect to their quality (i.e., the cost
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of a unit increase in quality, holding number constant)is greater, the
greater the number of children. Furthermore, with appropriate change of
language, the same may be said of the other commodities consumed by
the family. However, to simplify the analysis in this paper, we make the
quantity-quality distinction only for children. Thus, toillustrate our
reasoning, we specify the following simple utility function:
UU(n,q,y), (1)
where n is the number of children, q their quality (assumed to be the same
for all of the children), and y the rate of consumption of all other com-
modities. We start out with a simple budget restraint:
I = nqx +Yitv, (2)
where I is full income, it is the price of nq, andis the price of y. We
make no special assumptions about the elasticities of substitution among
n, q, and y, either in the utility function or in the household production
functions that underlie the it's.
The first-order conditions for maximizing the utility function subject
to the budget restraint are:
MU,, = Aqir = MUqXnit = MU5==Ap5,(3)
where the MU's are the marginal utilities, the p's are marginal costs or
shadow prices, and X is the marginal utility of money income. The im-
portant point is that the shadow price of children with respect to number
(pa) is positively related to q, the level of quality, and the shadow price
with respect to quality (p5)ispositively related to n, the number of
children. The economic interpretation is that an increase in quality is
more expensive if there are more children because the increase has to
apply to more units; similarly, an increase in quantity is more expensive
ifthe children are of higher quality, because higher-quality children
cost more.
These equilibrium conditions (3) together with the second-order condi-
tions can be found in several places in the literature on quantity and
quality(see,e.g., Houthakker 1952; Theil1952;Becker 1960; and
Willis's paper in this volume), but a number of their important implica-
tions for income and price effects apparently have not been explored.
1.IncomeEffects
Let the "true" income elasticities of demand for the number (n) and
quality (q) of children and for all other commodities (y) be iq, and
respectively.These elasticities are derived in the usual way by chang-
ing "income" while holding constant the "prices" of n, q, and y. The
appropriate prices for this purpose are the shadow prices (marginal costs)
If
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andp,,,whoseratios in equilibrium (see eq.{3 1)areequal to
the marginal rates of substitution in the utility function. The appropriate
income concept is the total "expenditure" on n, q, and y calculated at
these shadow prices;that is,the correct measure of income forthis
purpose is
(4)
It is well known that the mean value of the true income elasticities
is unity; that is:
npn yP1, (5)
Consider,however, the "observed" income elasticities, which we denote by
andderived by changing I while holding it and its, constant. It
follows directly from the budget restraint (2)andthe definitions of the
p's in (3) that the similarly weighted mean of the observed income elas-
ticities is I/R = I/(I +nqit),which is less than unity; that is:
I I qpq_ YPv_
1 > —= = + 'iq + —Tjy. (6)
RI±nqit R R R
That is, on the average, the observed elasticities are smaller than the
true elasticitiesin the ratio I/R. The economic explanationforthis
downward bias is simple. The direct effect of the increase in I, holding
the it's but not the p's constant, in general is to increase n, q, and y.
However, increases in n and q cause the shadow prices p,, and torise.
Thus, the percentage increase in real income in the sense of R deflated by
an index of theis less than the percentage increase in money income I.
This price effect of an increase in money income resembles somewhat
the price effect resulting from a rise in money income caused by a rise in
wage rates. The increase, in ratio terms, is less in real income than in
money income, because the costs of producing commodities in the house-
hold are increased by the rise in the price of time (see Becker 1965).'
We think that it is plausible to assume that the true income elasticity
with respect to quality (ii,)issubstantially larger than that with respect
to quantity Becauseof the downward bias in the observed elasticities
and the effect on prices, the observed elasticity for quantity may be
negative even though the true elasticity is not. Assume for simplicity
IThisprice effect, however, does offer a correction to the argument advanced by
Becker (1960), and followed by many others, that the price of children is the same
for the rich as for the poor (aside from the cost-of-time argument), even though the
rich choose more expensive children. The relevant price of children with respect to
their number is higher for the rich precisely because they choose more expensive
children. Similarly; the relevant price of cars, houses, or other goods is higher for the
rich because they choose more expensive varieties.84 GARY S. BECKER AND H. GREGG LEWIS
that=0.Let income 1 increase while holding x and constant.The
direct effect of the increase in I is to increase q (and y) while leaving n
unchanged. But then the shadow price with respect to quantity (Pu =qx)
will rise while the shadow price of quality=nit)and that of=
are unchanged, causing q and y to be substituted for n, and therefore
n will decline.
More generally, when the utility function and budget restraints are
those given above in equations (1) and (2), the observed income elastici-




= kanq +(1 —2k)aqy;
(1kOnq)2—(1— (8)
The a's are the familiar Allen partial elasticities of substitution in the
utility function; theare averages of the a's, and they must be positive;
Dand(1 — are positive by the second-order conditions. Equations
(7) verify that the observed quantity elasticity(ij,,) may be negative
even when the true quantity elasticity is positive. Furthermore, if
lq>n,,, aswe assume, ijq >unless q is a much better substitute than
n for y, for it follows from (7) and (8) that
1—k
(9)
Moreover,may exceedby more thanexceeds n,,;thatis, the
downward bias inmay be less than that in ii,,. This is easily seen for
the case in which anq ==a,3,,=a.Then D, which is positive, is
equal to(1 —a)[1 +a(l —2k)]and (1
(1— a), so that — — ifa > k.Indeed, may even
exceed asmay be seen from (7) and (8) by assuming=0and
anq=an,,=aq,,=a.Then (1 — k)(l — —a)[1 +
a(l— 2k)],whichwill exceed if,for example, k=anda =3's.
2the MathematicalAppendixtothispaper.
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Even if ii,, were constant, ij,, need not be, since the latter depends not
only onbutalso on the substitution elasticities and the share of nqx
in money income I (nqx/I = k/( 1 —k)).For example, if declinesas
income I rises—a plausible assumption, we think—ii,, would tend to rise
with income, even with constant n,,,and,of course,may rise With
income, contributing to the increase inIndeed, ij,, could be negative
at lower levels of income and positive at higher levels, the pattern observed
in some fertility data.3
2.Price Effects
Beforediscussing price effects, we generalize the budget constraint (2)
slightly as follows:
so that the shadow prices or marginal costs are now
(10)
(11)
These shadow prices for n and q each contain a "fixed" component: it,, in
p,,anditq inThe component nit, in child costs consists of costs that
depend on quantity but not on quality. Contraception costs and prenatal
child costs(such as maternity care)are moderately good examples.
Similarly, the component qitqdependson quality but not quantity, and
thus has the attributes of a "public good," or a better expression is a
"family good." Perhaps some aspects of training in the home and the
"handing down" of some clothing are reasonable examples. We assume
that the fixed component is more important for quantity than for quality,
that is, nit,,> qitq.
a)First consider the pure substitution effectsof an increase init,,
induced, say, by an exogenous improvement in contraceptive technique.
Since this increases the shadow price of quantity (p,,)relativeto both the
shadow price of quality and the shadow price of n would fall.
But the fall in numbers reduces the shadow price of quality= itq +
nit),which induces substitution in favor of quality. The outcome would
be not only a fall in quantity but also a relatively large rise in quality—
relative, that is, to other commodities—without assuming that quantity
and quality are better substitutes than any two commodities chosen at
random. Exactly the same result holds ifltq falls, say, because of an
increase in the education of parents. The fall ininduces an increase
in quality, which in turn induces an increase in the shadow price of
quantity (p,=it, +qit) andthus a relatively large decrease in quantity.
Consequently, both De (inhis paper which follows) that an
3 See the discussion and alternative explanation of this finding earlier in Willis's
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increase in the education of mothers has a strong positive effect on the
quality and a strong negative effect on the number of their children, and
the common belief that important advances in birth control knowledge
not only significantly reduce the number of children but also significantly
increase their quality, are consistent with the preceding analysis. Quantity
and quality are closely related, because the shadow price of quality de-
pends on quantity and the shadow price of quantity depends on quality.
We repeat that no special assumptions about substitution in household
production or consumption are required to derive a special relation between
quantity and quality.
b) Now consider the pure substitution effects of equal percentage in-
creases in it,,,ltq,andit due, say, to increases in wage rates. To put the
argument in extreme form, assume ltq=0 and it,, > 0. The equal increases
in it,,, itq, and it relative to=can be treated simply as a relative fall
in it,, = p,,. A fall in p,, initially would induce equal percentage declines in
n and q if they were equally good substitutes for y. However, since the
equal percentage declines in n and q would lower p,, more thann would
fall relative to q. Thus, the income-compensated elasticity of quantity with
respect to equal percentage changes init,,.,itqandit tends to be greater
numerically than the corresponding elasticity for quality. De Tray finds
that an increase in women's wage rates reduces the number of children by
a much bigger percentage than the quality of children.
This difference is, of course, accentuated if quantity is a better substitute
than quality for other commodities, which we think is a plausible, though
special, assumption. For then a fall indirectly induces a fall in n relative
to q, which accentuates the decline in p,, relative to Pn.
We conclude, therefore, that the observed price elasticity of quantity
exceeds that of quality, just the opposite of our conclusion for observed
income elasticities.4 This reversal of the quantity-quality ordering for price
and income elasticities is not only a somewhat unexpected implication of
the analysis, but also gives a consistent interpretation to the findings of
De Tray and others.
Of course, most of our discussion applies not only to the interaction
between the quantity and quality of children, but also to the quantity and
quality of cars, houses, food, tea, education, publications, and large num-
bers of other goods. The observed price and income elasticities of quantity
and quality will differ in predictable directions from the "true" elasticities.
A systematic analysis and reconsideration of the interaction between quan-
Thisconclusion about incomeelasticities,derived from the budgetrestraint
(2),ismodified somewhat when the budget restraint is of the more general form
(10), since the shadow price of quality is less sensitive to any given percentage change
in quality than the price of quality is to a change in quantity. Conceivably then,
ii,, could be greater thanat the same time that ii,, < butwe consider this
unlikely, sinceis probably much greater than ui,,.
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tity and quality of all goods from the viewpoint of this paper should be
quite rewarding.
Mathematical Appendix
The budget restraints specified in equations (2) and (10) are not linear in n
and q. It is precisely this nonlinearity, of course, that leads to the "interaction
between quantity and quality" that we discuss in this paper.
The derivation of the elasticities of the demand functions for number of
children (n) and child quality (q) can be carried in a direct fashion by differ-
entiating the budget restraint and the first-order conditions. Because of the
nonlinearity of the budget restraint, however, if this direct mode of derivation
is followed, it is all too easy to lose sight of the underlying income and substitu-
tion elasticities in the utility function. Hence, we follow an indirect approach
that makes use of quite familiar propositions in demand theory.
First, we replace the curvilinear budget surface given in equation (10) by a










It is well known that the true income elasticities(ii,,, and'ly) must satisfy
the relation
1 =++ (AS)
The observed income elasticities obtained by changing full income
I while holding the it's constant, however, must satisfy
I —k= —=++ (A6)
Equation (A6) may be verified by differentiating the budget restraint (10)
logarithmically with respect to I, holding the it's constant, and then using equa-
tions (A3) and (A4'i. Thus, the observed elasticities, on the average, are smaller
than the true elasticities in the ratio1 —k= I/R.
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Ep =+ + (A8)
where the symbol E denotes the natural logarithmic differential operator din.




Substitute these results (A9) into (A8) and then use (A7) to obtain
Ep = (1 —+kEnqrt. (AlO)
Now differentiate (A3) logarithmically:
ER(1 —k)EI+kEnqn. (All)
Subtract (Alo) from (All):
= (1 — (A12)
When I is increased, holding the it's constant, real income increases in the
smaller ratio 1 —k= I/R. This is the economic basis of the downward bias in
the observed income elasticities relative to the true income elasticities.
We now turn to the derivation of the observed income and substitution elas-
ticities. We make use of the well-known propositions that
En = + —(1— +kQGnQEPq,
Eq = + + —(1—kq)OqEPq,(A13)
(1 —=+kqanq;(1 —kq)oq=+knanq,
where thecs's are the Allen partial elasticities of substitution in the utility
function. Notice thatis the average elasticity of substitution of n against y
and q and thatis the similar elasticity for q against y and n.
We first derive the observed income elasticities andby letting I change
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— k
(1 —
=(1 — — 1. (A16)
k2(1
Dand (I — mustbe positive by the second-order conditions.
In the section on income effects, we used the simpler budget restraint (2)
rather than (10), so that we assumed that k;equations (7) and
(8) are simply equations (Al6) when= kq = k. The only proposition in
that section that needs qualification when the budget restraint is (10) is the
proposition that —Tj,,has the sign of —unless aqy is much larger than




where (1 —2ka)must be positive by the second-order conditions. 'In the section
on price effects, we assume that —=nit,, — is positive. But then
if Tlq/fln is sufficiently smaller than k,/kq, —willhave a sign opposite that
of Tlq —n,,. Wehave noted this qualification and commented on it (see n. 4
above).
We turn now to the income-compensated elasticities of quantity and quality
with respect to the it's, deriving them in essentially the same manner as the
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aqnq r == —kany)+ L RnIIq
(A20)
where the derivatives are income-compensated.
The observed elasticities with respect to=are
= —kany)— + ij=n, q,
(A21)
from which it follows that
= (Gny — (1—kanq)
+ —kq2aqy)+ —kq).
(A22)
Thus, if the a's are equal and if kn > kq, the quantity elasticity (ijflTY(8))exceeds
the quality elasticity thisdifference is increased if > 0qy'aspecial,
though plausible, assumption.
The observed elasticities with respect to equal percentage changes in tq,
andare simply those with respect toit,, but with signs changed. Thus, the
demand functions for a and q are homogeneous of degree zero in I and the it's,
just as they are in the shadow income (R) and the shadow prices (ft's).